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ABSTRACT
Glancy and Yadav (2010) developed a computational fraud detection model (CFDM) that
successfully detected financial reporting fraud in the text of the management 's discussion and
analysis (MDA) portion of annual filings with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). This work extends the use of the CFDM to additional genre, demonstrates
the generalizability of the CFDM and the use of text mining for quantitatively detecting
deception in asynchronous text. It also demonstrates that writers committing fraud use words
differently from truth tellers.
Keywords: asynchronous communication deception, CFDM, deception, text mining, financial
reporting fraud , identity theft , deception detection

1.

INTRODUCTION

Deception is the intentional misleading of
another such that they draw an inaccurate
conclusion (Buller and Burgoon, 1996; Carlson,
George, Burgoon, Adkins, and White, 2004;
DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J. , Malone, B. E. ,
Muhlenbruck, L. , Charlton, K. , and Cooper,
H. , 2003). Fraud is criminal deception as
defined by the laws of the country. Research
has found deception and fraud to be important
questions because the costs of deception and
fraud are extensive. Investors lost billions of
dollars when financial reporting fraud was
uncovered
at
Enron,
WorldCom,
and
Broadcom. Some of these investors were
pension plans; the loss resulted in reduced
pensions of the plan members. Many
individuals lost their jobs, which cost
taxpayers' unemployment compensation. While
these three are widely known examples of
financial reporting fraud, they are certainly not
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the only ones . And yet, fraud is difficult to
recognized. Often times, fraud will be
committed for several years before it is
discovered. Madov's Ponzi scheme lasted for
more than 14 years before discovery
(Markopolos, 2005).
A writer of deceptive text should know
that the writing is deceptive. The problem has
been how the reader can detect deceptive
writing. In the past , many researchers
attempted to find cues that indicate that
writing is deceptive. DeP aulo, et al. (2003)
looked at 1338 different studies that attempted
to find cues to that would confirm deception;
158 deception cues were identified (DePaulo et
al., 2003). These cues were grouped into five
different sets of predictions relating to liars
and truth tellers. The predictive sets were:
liars will be less forthcoming than truth tellers;
liars will have more discrepancies than truth
tellers; liars will be less positive and pleasant
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than truth tellers; liars will be tenser than
truth tellers; and liars' stories will have fewer
common imperfections and less unusual
content than truth tellers. The cues to these
predictive sets were divided into the following
groups: verbal, vocal, facial, active (body
positioning), quantity, time, rate of speaking,
pauses, types of words used, voice amplitude,
nervousness, and other behavioral cues.
In the meta-analysis, twenty-five cues were
statistically significant; and of the twenty-five,
only thirteen were relevant to text (DePaulo et
al., 2003). The cues relevant to text were
shorter response length, providing fewer
details, providing less sensory information,
blocking access to information, increased
response latency, less logical structure, greater
internal discrepancy, fewer self-references, less
immediacy
(actives
vs.
passives
and
affirmatives vs. negatives), increased tentative
constructions, less cooperative, more negative,
and less contextual embedding. The cues only
provide a potential method for detecting
deception.
Glancy and Yadav (2010) developed a
computational fraud detection model (CFDM)
that successfully detected financial reporting
fraud in the text of the management 's
discussion and analysis (MDA) portion of
annual filings with the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). The method
used text mining and clustering of the singular
value decomposition (SVD) (Albright , 2004) of
the document-term matrix. The CFDM was
able to classify a MDA as fraudulent or nonfraudulent. The results were very highly
significant, p = 0.0059. A sample of thirty
MDAs-ten fraudulent and twenty nonfraudulent- were tested. Nine out of ten
fraudulent MDAs tested as fraudulent. The
company that was a false negative was retested
using the MDA of the following year, and the
retest was positive (i.e., fraudulent). Sixteen of
twenty non-fraudulent MDAs tested as non-

Page 146

Detecting Deception in Asynchronous Text
fraudulent. The false positives may have been
unidentified fraudulent reports; it is not
possible to tell whether they are true false
positives. The result was that the CFDM was
very successful at classifying companies as
fraudulent and non-fraudulent. The CFDM
was quantitative, and it did not require human
interpretation of the text.
We use the CFDM methodology (Glancy
and Yadav, 2010) to answer the question: 'is
the CFDM generalizable to other genres than
the MDA?' We consider this question in the
remainder of this article.
Section 2 discusses the CFD M in more
detail and the methodology used to create the
model. Section 3 applies the methodology to
create models for detecting deception in three
additional
genres.
Section
4
discusses
conclusions, limitations, and future work.

2.
COlVlPUTATIONAL
FRAUD DETECTION
MODEL (CFDM)
The CFDM (Glancy and Yadav, 2011) was
created for detecting financial reporting fraud
by text mining the management's discussion
and analysis (MDA) of a company's annual
report. The process used to create the CFDM
is described below.
The first step was selecting fraudulent and
non-fraudulent
companies.
The
SEC 's
accounting and auditing enforcement releases
(AAER) were reviewed. The SEC issues an
AAER either during or at the conclusion of an
investigation of accounting or auditing
misconduct. The AAER states the reason for
the SEC's charge of misconduct; these will
normally require the company to restate their
financial report. The companies that were
selected as fraudulent were the ones the SEC
accused of fraud, and they either admitted the
fraud or were convicted of fraud in Federal
Court. Most companies that committed
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financial reporting fraud did so over a period of
years. The annual report used for text mining
was in the period the SEC identified in the
AAER. If a company knows that they are
under investigation by the SEC, they must
include that knowledge in the annual report.
The MDA selected was for the latest reporting
period that did not mention an SEC
investigation. This period was chosen because
it was unlikely that the company knew at this
point that the SEC was investigating them.
The report that first
mentioned the
investigation was normally in the year prior to
the SEC issuing the AAER, although in some
cases the company knew of the SEC
investigation for several years before the
AAER was issued.
For each fraudulent company selected, a
non-fraudulent company was selected. The first
criterion for a non-fraudulent company was
that they had not filed an amended financial
report with the SEC in the 10 years preceding
or proceeding the reporting year chosen for the
fraudulent company. The second criterion was
that they had the same SIC code (i.e., they
were in the same industry). The third criterion
was that they were approximately the same
size. This criterion applied only if there was
more than one company that met the first two
criteria.
The second step was to prepare each MDA
for text mining by eliminating all non-text
items. These included tables of numbers, notes
to tables, all headers and footers, punctuation,
and proper nouns. The individual MDAs were
saved as text files.
The third step was creating the document
set and text mining. All documents, both
fraudulent and non-fraudulent, were imported
in SAS® Enterprise Miner™ (EM) software.
Common words also called stop words were
eliminated (e.g. , a, an, the, and, for).
Punctuation
was
removed
and
all
capitalization was converted to lower case. The
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words were converted to terms by stemming.
The process of stemming reduces the word to
its base (e.g., absolutely becomes absolute,
finalize and finally become final). After
stemming, the words are referred to as 'terms.'
Stemming as used in this text mining also
identifies synonyms and separates words that
have different meanings depending on the part
of speech (e.g., a bank is a noun and
synonymous with a financial institution, bank
as a verb would refer to turning an airplane).
Text-mining is performed by starting with the
term document frequency matrix and then
calculating the single value decomposition
(SVD) (Albright, 2004) of the term-document
matrix. The SVDs are clustered (de Ville,
2006; Gao and Zhang, 2005; Roiger and Geatz,
2003). Each SVD identifies a document. The
clustering is bottom up (hierarchical) based on
the distance between the SVDs. The identity
of the documents remains after the SVD is
created, but the individual terms in the
document are not visible. However, the textmining program can calculate the probability
of a term being in a cluster and report the
terms with the highest probability for a
cluster. The explanation of the SVD is beyond
this paper, but Albright (2004) provides a
complete description of the SVD and its use in
text-mining.
The fourth step is analyzing the results.
The model had very good separation between
the fraudulent MDAs and the non-fraudulent
MDAs with 66 of 69 documents clustering
correctly. The three that did not cluster
correctly were false positives-companies
meeting the non-fraudulent criteria but
clustering with the fraudulent companies. The
model is based on the SVDs of the documents
used to create it. The model is used to test
other MD As to determine if they are
fraudulent or not. When a fraudulent
document is added to the original set of
documents and the SVD process is repeated, it
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should test as fraudulent by clustering with the
fraudulent
documents.
A non-fraudulent
document should test as not fraudulent and
cluster with the non-fraudulent documents.
The model was used to classify an
additional 31 MDAs, eleven fraudulent and
twenty non-fraudulent. The companies were
chosen using the same criteria that was used
for the original fraudulent and non-fraudulent
companies. Ten of the eleven fraudulent MDAs
were correctly identified. Sixteen of the twenty
non-fraudulent MDAs were correctly identified.
The results were evaluated with the sign test
(Conover, 1999), and the p-values for both
tests were less than 0.01.

3.
APPLICATION OF
THE CFDM PROCESS
The CFDM was successful in detecting
fraudulent MDAs. In order to demonstrate
that the CFDM methodology is generalizable
we investigate its use in an additional area in
financial
reporting
and
in
fraudulent
unsolicited email (spam). The CFDM process
was given a different test in financial reporting
fraud. The financial reporting fraud test was
on the text of the notes to the financial
statements of annual reports. The MDA is
normally written by one of the chief executives
of a company; we expect him to know if the
report is fraudulent. Accountants write the
notes to the financial statements; we do not
know if the accountant who wrote the note
knew that the report was fraudulent, but we
would anticipate that a good accountant would
at least suspect that the financial statements
were incorrect. The similarities between the
notes to the financial statements and spam are
that both are asynchronous and the authors of
notes to the financial statements in an annual
report are essentially anonymous to the reader
as are the authors of the spam.
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We used spam e-mails because many
unsolicited e-mails (spam) are fraudulent. The
global cost of spam is estimated at $130 billion
annually (Jennings, 2009). The cost to US
businesses is estimated at $42 billion annually.
We did two tests on spam. One spam test was
on e-mail that attempted to steal identity, and
the other test was on spam that attempted
money theft. Both financial reporting fraud
and fraudulent e-mails are asynchronous and
relatively anonymous. In both domains, the
reader can only make assumptions about the
identity of the writer. Both are available
electronically. Both are sent with the
expectation of deceiving the reader. Both are
often more than just deception; they are
fraudulent.
An estimated 62 trillion spam are sent
annually. Spam filters are biased toward
legitimate e-mail and detect it at a rate of
99. 99%. The bias toward detection of
legitimate e-mail and preventing false positives
or legitimate e-mail identified as spam (Yih,
Goodman, and Hulten, 2006) causes the filters
to pass on the recipient up to 5% of the spam.
Of the estimated 62 trillion spam e-mails sent
annually, spam filters will pass up to 3.1
trillion spam e-mails to the recipient's inbox.
In each of the three tests, the fraudulent
documents were matched with legitimate
documents from the same genre and in the
same period. The total number of documents
in each test varied from 69 to 110. The
documents were analyzed using the CFDM
methodology as described above (Glancy and
Yadav, 2011). The sample size for each study
was chosen for a statistical power over 90%
with an effect size of 0.20 to 0.30 (Cohen,
1988). The CFDM was used to create the
single value decomposition of the termdocument matrix and to cluster the
documents. The text mining clusters the
document set into as many clusters as
appropriate for the document set; the
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maximum number of clusters for a document
set is user specified and was set to forty for all
studies.

3.1

Annual Financial Report

Notes Test

CDFSL Proceedings 2017
MDA, we extracted the notes to the financial
reports and followed the CFDM methodology.
The results of the model were highly
significant, p-value less than 0.001 with 3 false
positives and three false negatives. The results
are shown in Table 1.

We were able to use the same data set as
Glancy & Yadav (2010). Instead of using the
Table 1.
Clusterinq results of the notes to annual financial reports test of the CFDM methodoloq1.1.

Clustering Results

Correctly Classified
63

Percentage correctly
classified
False Positive
False Negative
p-value
The notes from 11 fraudulent annual
reports and 20 non-fraudulent annual reports
were tested using the notes model. Each set of
notes was tested individually by adding them
to the document set and then re-running the
model. One of the 11 fraudulent documents
was a false negative and t hree of the 20 nonfraudulent were false positives. The p-value
was less than 0.001.

3. 2

Spam. Email Tests

The two tests on spam were on email that
either tried to steal identity or money. We sent
a request on Facebook for people to collect
email that escaped their spam filter and made
it into their inbox. The individual determined
that the email was stealing identity or money
and labeled it as such and forwarded it to the
authors. Over 40 people responded and over
2000 money-theft spam and over 3000 identitytheft spam were collected. The two tests are
discussed below.
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Incorrectly Classified
6
91.3%
3
3
2 X 10·13

3. 2 .1 Money Theft Spam. Email Test

In order to compare money theft email to
legitimate email that requests money, over
2,000 legitimate e-mails were collected from
legitimate sources that asked the recipient for
money (e.g., The Susan G. Komen Foundation,
the March of Dimes, and the American Cancer
Society). The spams and legitimate e-mail used
in the study were randomly chosen from those
collected. Originally the model was created
with fifty-five spams and fifty-five legitimate emails, which were saved as plain text and put
into a database. The results of the model were
very highly significant, p-value less than 0.001,
and are shown in Table 2. The number of
emails was increased to 100 for each type of
email (spam and legitimate) to increase the
probability of an email being incorrectly
identified and to increase the possible number
of clusters. The model was replicated 20 times
with the 100 emails randomly chosen from
legitimate emails and 100 randomly chosen
from money theft spam. The results in each
test were very highly significant, p-value less
than 0.001. In each trial, the number of
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clusters was two, even though the allowable

number

of

clusters

was

set

to

40.

Table 2
Clustering results of the notes to money theft spam test of the CFDM methodology.

Clustering Results

Correctly Classified

Incorrectly Classified

104

6

Percentage correctly classified
False Positive
False Negative
p-value

94.54%
2
4
3.300 X 10-24

3 . 2 . 2 Identity Theft Spam Email T est

In order to compare the spam email to
legitimate email, over 2,000 legitimate e-mails
were collected from the sources that were
spoofed by the spam, such as banks,
investment companies, and credit card
companies. The spams and legitimate e-mail
used in the study were randomly chosen from
those collected. The first model used fifty-five
spams and fifty-five legitimate e-mails, which

were converted to plain text and put into a
single database. The CFDM methodology was
applied to the single database and the results
were very highly significant, p-value less than
0.001, as shown Table 3. This test was also
replicated 20 times with 100 randomly chosen
spams and 100 randomly chosen legitimate
email. The results were consistent with pvalues for each model less than 0.001. Again,
the allowable number of clusters was set to 40,
but in every case the number of clusters was 2.

Table 3
Clusterinq results of the notes to identity theft spam test of the CFDM methodoloqy.

Clustering Results

Correctly Classified

Results of the CFDM T ests

The three tests of the CFD M process
replicated the results of the original CFDM
(Glancy and Yadav, 2011) in two domains and
three genres. The CFDM created in each genre
was successful at differentiating fraudulent text
from legitimate or non-fraudulent text . The
percentage of correctly identified documents
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3

107

Percentage correctly classified
False Positive
False Negative
p-value

3.3

Incorrectly Classified
97.27%
1
2
3.325 xl0-28

exceeded 91 % in all tests. The average of the
three tests was 94.37%. These results exceeded
those of Goel, Gangolly, Faerman, and Uzuner
(2010), using a support vector machine
methodology; the average correctly identified
in their three tests was 88.84%.
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4.
CONCLUSIONS,
LIMITATIONS AND
FUTURE-WORK
All three tests on asynchronous text used the
CFDM methodology to create models that
were able to successfully distinguish legitimate
asynchronous text from fraudulent text. In all
cases the number of clusters was two,
fraudulent and non-fraudulent. There were no
additional clusters. This confirms the accuracy
of the hierarchical clustering of the SVDs. This
also confirms that the CFDM methodology is
generalizable beyond financial reporting using
the MDA. Repeating the CFDM methodology
20 times on money-theft spam and 20 times on
identity-theft spam confirmed that the CFDM
methodology is repeatable and has potential
for developing a quantitative method of
filtering email. This is especially significant
when considering that the email used in the
tests had already escaped detection by
conventional email filters.

CDFSL Proceedings 2017
use words is subconscious; because if they were
aware of the way they were using words, they
would modify their writing to conceal the
fraud. Further work will utilize the results
from these tests to determine if a theoretical
basis for explaining the success of CFD M can
be developed.

A potential limitation of this work is that
only two genres were used for the testing,
financial reporting and spam. Future work can
include expanding the CFDM to additional
asynchronous genre to further confirm the
generalizability of the CFDM methodology.
Another limitation is that although we have a
quantitative method of detecting fraud in
asynchronous text, we do not know why it
works. The use of the SVD in text-mining does
not allow inspection of the terms in each
cluster and their frequency. It has been
experimentally proven to be successful, but at
this time we do not know what is in the text
that allows fraudulent documents to cluster
together when using the singular value
decomposition of the reduced document text
matrix. We can conclude that people
committing fraud use words differently from
those who are telling the truth. We can further
suggest that the way those committing fraud
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